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NUKING KASHMIR: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY
PAKISTAN AND INDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
Fakiha Khan*
"The earth will be enveloped in darkness. There will be
no day. Only interminable night. What shall we do then,
those of us who are still alive? Burned and blind and bald
and ill, carrying the cancerous carcasses of our children
in our arms, where shall we go? What shall we eat? What
shall we drink? What shall we breathe?"'
Since August 1947, South Asia has been victim to the ongoing tensions
between India and Pakistan. There have been a number of conflicts between
the two countries, some political, some ideological and some violent. One of
the oldest aspects of the ongoing Indo-Pak hostilities is the conflict over
Kashmir.2 The newest face of this rivalry is nuclear since both countries
declared their new status as nuclear powers in tests carried out by India on
May 11 and 13, 1998,3 and by Pakistan on May 28 and 30, 1998. 4 The
question now regards how this nuclear armament will affect the historic
tensions of the two countries.
I. KASHMIR
The roots of the Indo-Pak problems lie first and foremost in the creation of
Pakistan. Before World War H, India's myriad cultures and peoples were
united only by who ruled them, from the Moghuls to the Maharajas. With the
colonial movement, the United Kingdom planted seeds of its own dominion
and eventually took rule of most of the area except for about five hundred
* J.D. 2001, University of Georgia.
'Arundahati Roy, The End of Imagination, THE NATION, September 28, 1998, at 2
(commenting on the recent nuclear testing by India and Pakistan) (on file with author).
2 See generally Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation, 31
CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495 (1994) (giving a historical background of the Kashmir
controversy between India and Pakistan).
3 See Shri Atal Bahari Vajpayee, Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bahari
Vajpayee in Parliament, May 27, 1998 (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://www.indianenbassy.org/
pic/pm-.parliament.htm> (on file with author) [hereinafter 'Suo Moto Statement'].
4 See PRESS STATEMENT ISSUEDON 11 JUNE 1998 BY THE GOVERNMENTOFPAKISTAN, U.N.
Doc. A/52/951, S/1998/515 at 3, Annex 1 (1998).
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small princely states! As the rulers of India before them, the British also had
to deal with the administration of a large area with the added stress of internal
tensions among the indigenous peoples. In 1947, with the end of World War
H and the anti-colonialist movement, the British gave up control of India,
carving out Pakistan from predominately Muslim areas and allotting the
predominately Hindu areas to India." August 1947 thus served a dual purpose.
One, it was the independence of India from its colonial master, two, it was the
creation of what the Muslims considered a long awaited homeland and what
the Hindus thought of as a resentful separation of their sovereign nation.7
The matter was, however, not fully resolved because of the hundreds of
princely states, of which the area of Jammu and Kashmir was a part.' During
the British Raj,' these semi-autonomous states had administrative freedom, but
only to a certain extent.'0 In fact, the rulers of these princedoms had to
recognize the paramountcy of the Crown in the areas of defense, foreign
affairs and communications."
In 1846, the British granted Maharaja Gulab Singh the princedoms of
Jammu and Kashmir." The Maharaja (Hindu) ruled a seventy-five percent
Muslim population, and although he was fairly equitable towards the Muslims,
his descendants were not.' 3 Soon, the situation was such that the minority
Hindu population owned most of the land while the majority Muslim
population tilled it."' A political movement led by Sheikh Mohammad
Abdullah started up in the area with the formation of the All Jammu and
S See Anthony Wanis St John, THE MEDIATING ROLE IN THE KAsHMIRsDISPUTE BETWEEN
INDIAN AND PAKISTAN, 21-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD An'. 173, 174.
6 See id. at 173.
' The occasion of partition may explain the cultural distrust between the two countries. The
political situation within both countries and their foreign policies display a mutual antagonism,
if nothing else. The best explanation for these negative feelings may be rooted in the trauma of
partition. After all, Indians still refer to it as the biggest mistake of the British in India. Sensing
the dissatisfaction with their independence and perhaps anticipating a threat to their sovereignty,
Pakistanis approach India with a self-conscious defensiveness.
s See id. In fact, before the British entered, India was made up largely of a confederacy of
princedoms, each tiny area being ruled by its own prince. The British did take control of a large
portion of these princedoms, but about 561 princely states remained at the time of partition. See
SuMIT GANGULY, Ti CRisis IN KASHMIR 6 (1997).
' 'Raj' refers to the time of British rule of India.
'o See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 6 (1997).
" See id.
12 &e id.13 see id.
14 see i.
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Kashmir Muslim conference in 1932. " At the same time, there was a growing
movement for independence of India from the British led by Mohandas Gandhi
and Jawaharlal Nehru and their nationalistic movement for a secular, united
India on the one hand and by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his struggle for a
Muslim homeland on the other. Nehru, himselfofKashmiri descent, pressured
Abdullah to join the nationalist movement, which he accepted by changing the
party to the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference in 1939.16 Then, as
the nationalist movement took center stage, the Kashmiri struggle was put on
the back burner;' 7 however, the point of Kashmir was far from moot. In fact,
the Indian nationalists wanted Kashmir to show that Muslims and Hindus
could be united under the wing of nationalism, while the Muslims viewed
Kashmir as an integral part of what would be Pakistan.' s
At the time of partition, the British did carve India along religious lines, but
could not grant the princedoms to the new nations. 9 Hence, the British gave
these states the choice of either acceding to India or Pakistan or becoming
independent nations." The choice was not really a choice in most circum-
stances because of the geography of the area.21 In order to give both Pakistan
and India somewhat contiguous territories, the bulk of the states acceded to
whichever state they were nearest.2 Jammu and Kashmir, Jugandh, and
Hyderabad, along with a few others, were the exceptions."
The accession debate became heated when the question became who would
decide the ultimate fate of the princedoms-the princely ruler or the people.2
Both countries wavered on which would be the correct manner of accession
depending on which choice suited their political motives.' On the issue of
Jugandh, when the Muslim ruler asked for accession to Pakistan and it
accepted, the Indian army entered the area and offered the Hindu population
a chance at self-determination. The vote came out, as expected, in favor of
Indian accession.' On the other hand, Hyderabad had no real choice because
Is See id.
36 See id. at 7.
17 See id.
n See id. at 7-8.
'9 See Khan, supra note 2, at 495.
'o See i. at 496.
23 See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 7-8.
" See id.
' See Khan, supra note 2, at 508.
2 See id.
See i. at 510.
6 See id. at 509.
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India's military entered the area and declared accession to India on behalf of
the Hindu population without a vote or a letter of accession by the ruler. 7
The big problem, now, was Kashmir because it had a Muslim population
ruled by a Hindu Maharaja and it abutted both Pakistan and India. 2 To make
the situation worse, in October of 1947, a band of Pathans" from the North
West Frontier Province of Pakistan came into Kashmir, took the city of
Muzaffarabad, and then headed towards the capital of Srinagar.' Taken off
guard, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to his neighbor, the prince ofPatiala, and
although the Patialan reinforcements arrived, they were unsuccessful in
fighting off the Pathans.3l Thus, Hari Singh appealed to Nehru in India, and
on the advice of Lord Mountbatten (the last British Vice-roy), India offered to
help Hari Singh in exchange for a letter of accession to India.32 Even though
Nehru agreed to ask Hari Singh to accede, he pushed for a condition on the
letter of accession that it would be ratified by a vote of the Kashmiri people.33
So, the Maharaja offered a letter of accession to India on October 26, 1947,
and the letter was accepted without a vote by the people.'
While Pakistan had championed the right of the ruler to decide the ultimate
fate of his princedom in Jugandh, it now cried out for a vote by the majority
Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir, knowing that the vote would
probably favor accession to Pakistan. At the same time, India (who had fought
for the right of the Jugandhi peoples to choose accession) now firmly stood for
the right of the Maharaja to make the choice, while remaining firmly in
support of its intrusive actions with Hyderabad." Although the actions of both
countries regarding Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jugandh showed the
political aspects of the issue, the accession debate now centered solely on
Jamnmu and Kashmir because of the mixed religious dynamics of the area and
its strategic position between the countries.' By November of 1947, what had
27 Seeid. at 510.
21 See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 9.
" 'Pathans' are members of the indigenous tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province of
Pakistan.
30 See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 10.
31 See id.
32 ee id.
33 See id.
4 See St. John, supra note 5, at 175.
3' See Khan, supra note 2, at 510.
36 See generally Khan, supra note 2 (explaining the role ofreligion in the Kashmir conflict).
The people of the Kashmir valley and Gilgit are Muslim, while those of Jammu are Hindu and
those of the Ladakh and Baltistan region are Buddhist. See id. at 496.
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begun as the taking of Muzaffarabad by the Pathans had turned into full scale
fighting between Pakistani and Indian troops.
3
"
The political debate over accession culminated into three separate wars
between Pakistan and India-1947, 1965, and finally in 197 l. 8 The latest of
these wars resulted in an official peace between the countries and more
importantly, in the Treaty of Simla. This treaty established the Line of Control
(LOC) along the Kashmir border that is now the center of hostilities.39
Between the first and last war, the United Nations (UN) also passed a number
of resolutions regarding Kashmir, re-affirming the right of the Kashmiri people
to an internationally supervised plebiscite,' 0 urging India to restore peace to the
region, and calling for Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the area.4'
Although Pakistan did officially remove its forces, and India did attempt to
restore peace, tensions arose again and no internationally supervised plebiscite
ever took place.
The Simla Agreement, however, looked to be a step in the right direction
because it would serve as a basis for bilateral negotiations and because it, too,
referred to the right of the Kashmiri people to choose their own future. Still,
it failed to be a final resolution, for the tensions remained. As it stands, the
Line of Control is serving as the interim border, with most of the area in the
hands of Pakistan (Northern portions of Gilgit and Baltistan), India (Kashmir
Vale and Ladakh), and China (Aksai Chin portion of Ladakh).42 A portion of
the western Kashmir valley (Azad or "Free Kashmir") is also 'in' Pakistan
even though it is virtually free of control from Pakistani administration. 43 The
remaining portions of the Kashmir valley are now the bone of contention
between India and Pakistan.
Another aspect of the conflict are the Kashmiri people. Not only is there
fighting between India and Pakistan, but there is also extensive bloodshed at
the hands of internal Kashmiri militants fighting each other." The result has
been over-reaching devastation throughout Kashmir, including human rights
" See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 11.
3' See St. John, supra note 5, at 174.
'9 See generally The Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972, India-Pak. 858 U.N.T.S. 71.
4' Plebiscite refers to an election where all the people of an area are asked to vote on which
government they want to represent them.
4" See, e.g., S.C. Res. 91, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995 (1951); G.A. Res. 80,
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1469 (1950); S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 3rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/726 (1948).
42 See St. John, supra note 5, at 175.
43 See id.
" See generally Khan, supra note 2 (explaining the movement of internal Kashmiri
separatists).
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abuses by both the Indian army and the freedom fighters (allegedly supplied
and trained by Pakistan).' 5 The last fifty years have brought no resolution to
the conflict, and even as recently as 1994, tensions became so high as to cause
an expulsion of the other's diplomats by both countries.'
II. NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
Since the Second World War, the threat of Nuclear War has been present
not only because of the Cold War, but also because of the possibility of other
nations seeking nuclear weapons. Among these nations were Pakistan and
India. With their tense historical relations (buttressed by an equally tense
relationship between India and its considerably larger nuclear neighbor,
China' 7), the two were prime targets for non-proliferation efforts.' The rest
of this section will present a short timeline of the nuclear programs of both
India and Pakistan from inception to the current situation.
A. India's Nuclear Program
The Indian government showed its interest in nuclear development soon
after independence with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1948, which
looked towards the promise of economic development through atomic
energy.49 In fact, in 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that
"nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to
41 See St. John, supra note 5, at 176.
4 See id. at 174. To further complicate the situation, Pakistan's democratic government was
overthrown by a military coup, led by General Pervez Musharraf, in October 1999. See David
Gardner & Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan 'sLongRoadto Stability, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July
12, 2000, at 25. This change in Pakistan's political situation triggered fear about Kashmir In
many, especially considering that many in Indian politics were completely averse to the idea of
talks with the military leadership. Cf. id.; See also India Will Not Talk to Pakistan or its
"Military CEO" (visited July 5,2000) <www.in.news.yahoo.com/000703/7/19hl.html> (stating
that Ajit Panja, the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, questioned how India
"could... shake hands with Musharraf whose hands are blood stained?").
47 See Richard D. Aldrich & Deborah Charron Pollard, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons
Program: Legal and Policy Implications of the Pressler Amendment, 5 J. LEG. STUD. 103, 103
(1995).
4' See generally Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 593 (1987)
(explaining that because of the tense relations between India and Pakistan, the two countries
should be steered away from acquiring nuclear weapons).
49 See Paper Laid on the Table of the House on the Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy
(visited Feb. 5, 2000), May 27, 1998 120 <http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclearpolicy.
htm> (on file with author) [hereinafter Paper Laid on the Table].
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forge weapons of mass destruction."-" With this policy, India entered the
nuclear arena as early as the 1960's when the United States (U.S.) and Canada
helped India build and run its first nuclear reactor (CIRUS) in 1964. 1 The
United States granted the assistance under the Agreement for Cooperation
Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy or the Tarapur Agreement. That
treaty offered American aid in developing India's non-military nuclear
capabilities to be used only for non-military purposes, i.e., not to be used in the
production of nuclear weapons.52 CIRUS was followed by a set of twin
reactors in Rajasthan built with aid from Canada in the 1970's and 1980's and
finally with India's very own reactor in Madras in 1983."
Under the cooperation agreements with Canada and the United States, India
was technically obligated to undergo international inspection in the form of
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the
safeguards did not work effectively to stop non-civilian use by India. IAEA
safeguards did not govern Tarapur because the agency was formed after the
Tarapur agreement.55 In addition, Madras was not governed because that
reactor was built without foreign assistance.5' India used the plutonium from
each plant for eventual military use, and when it could not use the plutonium
because of international safeguards, there is some evidence that India received
essential supplies from China."
Then, in 1974, India exploded an atomic bomb using nuclear imports
intended for non-military use.58 Since that time, India has had a vigorous
nuclear program that cites national security and fear of China's nuclear
capabilities as its raison d'itre.59 In fact, the Indian government said to its
Parliament that "in our region there has come into existence a pattern about
clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials, missiles and related technologies.
India, in this period, became the victim of externally aided and abetted
So Id. at 4.
s, See Milhollin, supra note 48, at 595.
52 See Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963,
U.S.-Ind., 14 U.S.T 1484,488 U.N.T.S 21.
" See Milhollin, supra note 48, at 596.
See id. at 598.
s See id. at 597.
u See id.
,See id. at 596.
, See id. at 595.
5 See, e.g., PaperLaid on the Table, supra note 49, at 8-10; Interview with Prime Minister
Atal Bahari Vajpayee, INDIA TODAY, May 25,1998 (visited Dec. 28,1999) <http://www.india-
today.com/itoday/25051998/vajinhtml> (on file with author) (citing security as the main reason
for the nuclear tests).
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terrorism, militancy and clandestine war through hired mercenaries. "6
Though not naming Pakistan, it is likely that the reference to terrorism and
mercenaries is a reference to Pakistan's role in the Kashmir conflict. With this
background, the Indian nuclear program came into fruition with a set of
underground nuclear tests in May of 1998.
Despite its status as a nuclear power, India continues to commit itself to the
elimination of nuclear weapons altogether even though it has reiterated that it
cannot and will not sign onto the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)."'
The major reasons for India's refusal to sign the NPT are the treaty's inherent
weaknesses and its discriminatory effects on non-nuclear states.62
Currently, India has a deterrent type of nuclear policy whereby it will only
use the weapons for retaliation.' Further, the Indian government has declared
a unilateral moratorium on further testing." According to Prime Minister
Vajpayee, India's "intentions were, are, and will always be peaceful .... India
is now a nuclear weapons state. [But] [o]urs will never be weapons of
aggression." 5 India has also not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
which it views as a divergence from the original idea of a true comprehensive
test ban, a final text that "does not do justice to the negotiating mandate."
As for the future, the Indian National Security Advisory Board's Draft
Report states that research and development of nuclear technology will
continue' while reaffirming the commitment to a no-first-use policy and
disarmament." More specifically, India plans on acquiring light water reactors
from friendly countries in an effort to have the capability of producing 20,000
mw by the year 2020.69 To some scholars, the implications of Indian nuclear
proliferation were clear even before India officially disclosed its nuclear
capabilities. As one commentator noted, "the Indians will deploy [a nuclear
o Paper Laid on the Table, supra note 49, at 18.
6, See id. at 15 (citing various nuclear prohibition initiatives taken by India).
" See generally, Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global
Non-Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407 (1994).
63 See Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,
Aug. 17,1999 § 2.3 (visited Feb. 5,2000) <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/nuclear.htm>
(on file with author) [hereinafter NSAB].
" See Paper Laid on Table, supra note 49, at 19.
65 Interview with Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpayee, supra note 59, at 9.
" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.indianembassy.org/
policy/CTBT/ctbt-index.htm> (on file with author) [hereinafter 'CTBT India'].
67 See NSAB, supra note 63, at § 7.
"See id. at § 8.
69See India Hits Out at Critics oflts Nuclear Tests, India Abroad News Service, September
24, 1998 (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http://hvk.org/hvktarticles/0998/0042.html>.
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bomb], which would force a Pakistani test... If this happened, South Asia
would be left with a pair of nuclear-armed rivals face to face . ...7o The
prophecy became reality only weeks after India tested its bomb, when Pakistan
conducted its own underground tests.
B. Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear program, like India's, finds its roots in cooperation
agreements with the United States. As with India, the United States signed a
cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 1955 under which the United States
would facilitate Pakistan's atomic energy program as long as it is used for
peaceful, non-military purposes.71 The treaty dealt with America leasing
enriched Uranium to Pakistan and exchanging information regarding atomic
energy development for "peaceful and humanitarian uses of atomic energy."72
While India was more forthright in its nuclear development, overtly using
'civilian' reactors for ultimate military purposes, Pakistan's programs were
more covert. The central figure in Pakistan's nuclear program was Dr. Abdul
Qadeer Khan, although Pakistan officially denied his involvement until the late
1970's.73 But, with more media coverage of the country's uranium enrich-
ment, Pakistan eventually recognized Dr. Khan, though only giving him the
status of any other scientist working with the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission.74 In January of 1987, after two decades of secret development,
Dr. Khan admitted not only to his involvement but also implied the success of
a Pakistani nuclear weapons program.7
On the U.S. front, Congress had been expressing concern over nuclear
proliferation. Starting with the Glenn-Symington Amendment in 1977,
Congress declared that no aid would be given to any country "which the
President determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment materials, or
technology to any other country... or receives such equipment, materials, or
technology." 76 Under the amendment, President Jimmy Carter cut aid to
70 Milhollin, supra note 48, at 593.
7' See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government ofthe United States of America
and the government of Pakistan concerning civil uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 11, 1955, U.S.-
Pak., 6 U.S.T. 2665.
72 Id. at 2665.
" See Aldrich & Pollard, supra note 47, at 105.
74 See id.
7s See id.
76 Aldrich & Pollard, supra note 47, at 106 (citing the Glynn-Symington Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2346 (aa) (1990)).
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Pakistan because it was receiving nuclear materials for military use and using
them for unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing facilities at Kahuta,
Chashma, and New Labs." Once President Ronald Reagan took over the
administration in the 1980's, however, the U.S. focus turned from Pakistan's
nuclear program to the threat of communism in Asia through the USSR and
China. In efforts to win allies in the area, President Reagan successfully
procured annual exemptions to the Glenn-Symignton Amendment for
Pakistan.' The result was a reformulation of the law so that there was an
automatic exemption for Pakistan as long is it did not possess a nuclear
explosive device. As soon as it did possess such a device, all aid would be cut
off." At the time, Pakistan fully supported the amendment. But as current
history shows, the amendment did not effectively stop Pakistani development
of nuclear weapons."
While both rivals continued in their respective quests for building nuclear
capabilities, the international community began serious non-proliferation
efforts. These efforts culminated in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and more importantly, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in
1968."1 While both India and Pakistan signed the first of the treaties, both
abstained from agreeing to the provisions of the NPT. s2 Both countries have
cited security concerns and resentment for the treaty's seemingly discrimina-
tory provisions that leave non-nuclear countries no real nuclear options.83
Since that time, Pakistan sponsored a General Assembly non-binding
resolution for the creation of a South Asia Nuclear Free Zone in 1984.
" See id.
7n See id.
" See id. at 106 (citing Pressler Anendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2375 (e) (1990)).
'o See id. at 107. In fact, according to news sources, "China is continuing to help Pakistan
build long-range missiles that could carry nuclear warheads." Ian Brodie, China's Aid to
Pakistan Bomb Risks US Deal, TIE TIMES (London), July 3, 2000, at 16. However, Pakistan
consistently denies any reports of further nuclear testing and in fact, has reaffirmed a unilateral
moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. See Pakistan Denies US Reports About Preparations
for Another Nuclear Test, THE NEWS INTERNATIONAL, May 25,2000, at 10.
" See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, August 5, 1963, 1038 U.N.T.S. 323 [hereinafter 'Partial Test Ban Treaty'] and Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 1058 U.N.T.S. 391 [hereinafter
'NPT'].
82 See Raju G.C. Thomas, India's Nuclear Programs and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 5 WIS. INT'L L.J. 108, 110(1987).8 See id.
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However, India, along with Bhutan and Mauritius, voted against the resolution,
indicating its unwillingness to close any doors on its nuclear capabilities."
Because Indian tests occurred first, Pakistan's stated reasons for nuclear
armament were not an arms race, but rather, national security concerns from
the Indian front." In fact, in a statement to the United Nations, the permanent
representative from Pakistan stated that "[flaced with these ominous
developments resulting from India's deliberate and calculated actions to alter
the strategic equation, Pakistan was left with no choice but to exercise its
nuclear option in its supreme national interest.. . ."" Even though the
statement takes a defensive tone, and the tests are characterized as security
motivated, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also pointed out that Pakistan has had
the capabilities for such tests and armament for the last fifteen or twenty
years.8 7
As the situation stands now, all efforts to prevent Asian proliferation have
ended in no success. Similarly, all efforts with the Kashmir situation have
found no success. In either case, it appears to be a lack of active solution
making on the part of both India and Pakistan and the international commu-
nity. All efforts thus far seem to focus on retention of the status quo without
any serious dialogue or any actual resolution.
Both the problems of Kashmir and the nuclear non-proliferation efforts are
now at a dangerous cross roads in South Asia. Some facts of history are clear:
the two have fought over Kashmir before; they continue to exchange sporadic
military fire, and (more frequently) diplomatic debate over the future of
Kashmir; the two have also been very serious about developing nuclear
weapons for security and in fact mention each other in reference to their
security concerns."
From these premises, the question that presents itself is what will happen
to the area if another war breaks out between India and Pakistan and either
'4Seeid. at 109.
u See generally Sharifs Remarks, ABCNEWS.COM, May 28, 1998 (visited Dec. 28, 1999)
<http:/Aww.abcnews.go.con/sectins/world/DaiyNews/pakistan980528--sharif.hrd> (stating
that Pakistan's reasons for nuclear testing were in response to India's tests) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Sharifs Remarks].
U4 STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TOTHE UNITEDNATIONS
IN THE SEcuRrrY CouNcIL's DEBATE oN 6 JUNE 1998, U.N. SCOR, 3890th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3890 [hereinafter SCOR Debate, June 6, 1998].
7See Sharifs Remarks, supra note 85, at 15.
u See id. at 16. See also STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO
THEU.N. SECU1YCouNcLON22 SEPTEMBER 1999, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 42, U.N. Doc.
A/54/PV (referring to Pakistan and China as security threats for whom nuclear weapons are
necessary) [hereinafter 'India's Statement of 12/20/99'].
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country decides to make use of its nuclear capabilities. Though no one can
predict the outcome of the South Asian cold war, the prospect of a nuclear war
is hardly a pleasant or acceptable resolution to Kashmir. In this context, it is
vital that the international community re-think its current stance of non-
proliferation efforts as well as long-term dispute resolution so that the world
does not have to witness another arms race between two historical rivals-a
race that could develop into an increasingly dangerous game of 'chicken' as
both try to keep up with the other.
Ill. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The legal implications of the current situation are far reaching. The
specific issues that require analysis are: 1) lack of a fair election for the
Kashmiri peoples, 2) control of the area by the Indian government and the
actions of the Indian military, 3) support of insurgents and guerrilla groups by
Pakistan and India, and 4) nuclear armament by both countries." The
obligations of both states regarding Kashmir have two distinct sources-the
UN Charter (and its provisions on international disputes) and the Simla
Agreement (which refers to the UN Charter)." As for the nuclear question, it
should be narrowed to the Kashmir context; the legal analysis will be more
complex because neither country is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT), which is commonly understood to be the most important
document of the international non-proliferation efforts. The new Comprehen-
sive Test Ban Treaty presents similar problems because both states refuse to
ratify the treaty without some confidence building measures.9' Therefore, the
search for a guiding source leads to the advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice as the legal wing of the United Nations and to the possibility
of customary international law regarding nuclear testing and aggression. More
specifically, the analysis will focus on the implications of the nuclear situation
under the Simla Agreement.
n See generally GANGULY, supra note 8 (giving a historical analysis of the politics
surrounding the Kashmir conflict).
"See Sinla Agreement, supra note 39, at 1 I.
9 See No Pressure to Sign Ban Treaty: India, DAWN THE INTERNET (visited Dec. 23,1999).
<http://www.dawn.com/daily/19991223/top2.hrn> (on file with author). See also Pakistan to
Retain Right to Conduct Nuclear Tests, DAWN THE INTERNET, Dec. 23, 1999 (visited Dec. 23,
1999) <http:/Iwww.dawn.com/daily/19991223/topl.htm> (on file with author).
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A. Sources
The first portion of this section will deal with the presence of India and
Pakistan in and around Kashmir. In order to do justice to the issue, it is vital
to understand that historically, both countries view the other's claim to the area
as illegal.' Pakistan views the accession to India as invalid for the will of the
people was never considered (because no vote was ever held) for the accession
in October of 1947.9' However, in a purely legal sense, the accession was
valid under the Indian Independence Act, which gave the final decision on
accession to the Maharaja." On the other hand, the basis for allotting territory
to Pakistan at all was the religious preference of the people in the areas.9"
Jammu and Kashmir, being majority Muslim, should, in theory, have been
included in the initial territories allotted to Pakistan. As the debate on this
issue raged, the war of 1947 broke out, and the issue developed a further
dimension.
The war was started when Pakistani tribesmen entered Kashmir and took
the city of Muzaffarabad.' India has, since then, consistently alleged that the
Kashmir situation is caused by the covert actions of Pakistanis within the
region." To a certain extent, the allegation may be correct. A majority of the
insurgent and guerrilla groups are armed and trained within Pakistani borders,
often with the help of the Pakistani military wing of the Interservice Intelli-
gence (ISI)." However, the problem is not wholly made by Pakistan, which
only took advantage of a precarious situation for political purposes."
On the other hand, Pakistan claims that the situation is the result not only
of the Indian government's illegal meddling with the electoral process, but
also because of its "historical betrayal, state repression, religious discrimina-
tion, economic deprivation," et cetera." Although some of these allegations
may be true, there is no general, monolithic repression of Kashmiris by the
Indian government."°'
See ViCTORIA ScHOFIELD, KAsHMR iN ThE CRossFwEm 162-63 (1996).
'" See SCOR Debate, June 6, 1998, supra note 86, at 28-29.
"See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 13-14.
See St. John, supra note 5, at 174.
See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 13-14.
97 See id. at 15.
"See id.
See id. at 16. Rather than declaring war on India, Pakistan only supplied the internally
based terrorists. So, the situation is not one of outright aggression, but of fanning the internal
politics for the sake of the Kashmir agenda. See i.
100 Id.
10' See Id. at 17.
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In truth, both countries had a hand in the creation and perpetuation of the
Kashmiri problem. Thus, after the 1948 cease fire, the United Nations became
involved and issued a set of resolutions." In these resolutions, the United
Nations repeatedly affirms the rights of the Kashmiri people to decide their
own fate, implying that the letter of accession is invalid without a general
ratification. 10 3 Further, through Resolution 39, the United Nations set up a
Commission of the Security Council, composed of representatives of three
member states, one to be chosen by India, one by Pakistan, and the third to be
designated by the two chosen representatives.' 4 The duties of the commission
were to include traveling to Kashmir and keeping the Security Council
informed of its investigations pursuant to Article 34'°5 and to exercise "any
mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties.' '
A few months after this resolution, the Security Council adopted Resolution
47. This document noted the urgency of the Kashmir conflict and the
willingness of both India and Pakistan to decide the question of accession
through free and impartial plebiscite.' 7 The resolution also requested that the
government of Pakistan withdraw from Jammu and Kashmir any of its forces
and any Pakistani nationals who may have gone to the area to fight.'08
Moreover, Pakistan had the obligation under Resolution 47 to prevent any
fighters from entering Jammu and Kashmir and to refrain from providing any
aid to them.' 9
Conversely, India had the responsibility of managing the cessation of the
fighting in Jammu and Kashmir and to withdraw its own forces from the area
to the satisfaction of the commission." However, in the interest of maintain-
ing peace, India was allowed to leave a minimum number of troops in the
area." 1 As soon as order was maintained, India was to recruit local personnel
112 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 38, U.N. Doc. S1651 (1948); S.C. Res. 39, U.N. Doc. S/654 (1948);
S.C. Res. 47, U.N. Doc. S/726 (1948).
to See Res. 47, supra note 41.
104 See Res. 39, supra note 102, at § A.
'0 Article 34 of the U.N. Charter states that "The Security Council may investigate any
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art. 34.
'" Res. 39, supra note 102, at § C (2).
'07 See Res. 47, supra note 41, at 13.
"'s See i. at §A L.(a).
109 See id.
"o See id. at § A 2.(a).
"' See id. at § A 2.(c).
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to re-establish and maintain law."2 In addition, if the local forces were
inadequate, Pakistan and India would have to confer on the entrance of troops
from either country to keep the peace.' 3 The most important portion of the
resolution, however, regarded a plebiscite."' The Indian authorities were
responsible for organizing the election, but under the supervision of a UN
appointed plebiscite administrator who would have the Indian forces at his/her
disposal for the fair administration of the plebiscite."5 Above all, the elections
had to be free of meddling, and India had the responsibility to make sure this
was so."" Finally, the Indian government was responsible for removing all
Indian citizens who were not Kashmiri and to release all Kashmiri political
prisoners.
117
Despite the all encompassing mandates of Resolution 47, the impartial
election never took place."" In fact, "whenever the elected local government
in the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir showed any direct or indirect support
for the idea of self-determination, India suspended the local government and
brought the occupied territories under its direct rule.""'9 Jammu and Kashmir
became part of the Indian union after a pro-Indian constituent Assembly
adopted a new state constitution.?" However, the international community and
the United Nations rejected the legal authority of the Assembly in a Security
Council resolution.' 2' The international community continued to press for an
impartial plebiscite for the Kashmiris but to no avail."
The United Nations' involvement in the dispute came to a slow halt due to
the Cold War."' Because of U.S.-Soviet Union tensions, the Security Council
could come to no consensus regarding Kashmir. The efforts ended in a
stalemate, leaving the Kashmiris with a precarious future."u The international
community could do nothing, so Pakistan started its own mission to liberate
Kashmir by violating the cease-fire line of 1948.'25 A new war broke out and
112 See id. at § A4.
' See Res. 47, supra note 41, at §§ A 4-5.
"4 See id. at § B 6.
"' See id. at §§ B 9-10.
116 See id.
117 See id. at §§ B 13-14.
.. See Khan, supra note 2, at 518-519.
119 Id.
120 See id.
121 See generally S.C. Res. 91, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2017/Rev. 1 (195 1).
'" See Khan, supra note 3, at 520.
12 See id.
12 See id.
, See id. at 521.
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ended in the Tashkent Declaration, which was mediated by the Soviet
Union. " The Tashkent Declaration required both parties to assume their pre-
war borders and to respect the cease fire line. Further, it encouraged cross
border dialogue. It did not, however, contain any provisions for an election. 27
B. The Silma Agreement
The peace would not stay long, and only a few years after the Declaration,
Pakistan and India clashed again. This time, negotiations resulted in the Simla
Agreement, which essentially superseded the Tashkent Declaration and the
1948 cease-fire line." According to the Simla Agreement, Pakistan and India
agreed that:
1. the UN Charter would govern their relations;
2. the two would settle their differences through bilateral
negotiations;
3. neither would unilaterally alter the situation;
4. both would prevent organization, assistance or encourage-
ment of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of
peaceful and harmonious relations;
5. according the United Nations Charter, both will refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity of the other;
6. the cease-fire line will be the Line of Control (LOC) and
both nations will retreat to their own sides of the LOC;
7. the two will meet to discuss how to keep peace between
India and Pakistan.'"
Notably, like the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla Agreement also did not
mention a plebiscite for the Kashmiris, although it affirmed twice the
obligations under the UN Charter.'" Finally, the agreement stated that mutual
differences or legal interpretations cannot be used to justify any revision of the
Line of Control.'
12 See id.
127 See Tashkent Declaration, Jan. 10, 1966, India-Pak., 560 U.N.T.S. 39.
128 See Khan, supra note 3, at 527.
'" See Simla Agreement, supra note 39.
130 See id.
13 See id.
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C. Bilateralism
Although the IN declarations do not give much assistance in judging the
actions of India, there is more to look at in the Simla Agreement, which sets
up a score of obligations for both India and Pakistan. Of the important
portions of these mutual obligations is the provision regarding bilateral
decision making to change the status quo.'32 Incidentally, this provision has
often been cited as the reason for controversies regarding the Simla Agreement
because whenever Pakistan pushes for third party intervention, India refuses
on the grounds that it is against the bilateral approach of the Simla
Agreement.'33 In fact, India has shown mistrust of third party involvement,
especially the West, in solving disputes in Asia and so prefers to deal with the
Kashmir issue on bilateral terms. "
The Agreement also states that the parties will find a final resolution to the
Kashmir problem, implying that the Agreement is not the final solution.
3
Therefore, India and Pakistan alone must convene to decide the Kashmir issue,
because that is what bilateralism requires of them. Though in theory this may
work, the problem of bilateralism is that it fails to take the internal division of
the Kashmiri people into account. Not all Kashmiris consider accession to
India or Pakistan the only alternatives.' 6 Even for India and Pakistan, a
bilateral approach may not be the best one for the Kashmir dispute because
both governments use the issue as a political vehicle. 3 7 Thus, Kashmir is a
major part of both countries' foreign relations and internal politics. 3
Consequently, any bilateral negotiation would not be free of these internal
political considerations, which only muddle the already complicated situation
in Kashmir.33 Both countries have serious pressure to hold on to Kash-
mir-all of it-and to give nothing to the other side. Neither is willing to
compromise on the issue, partly because of pressure of domestic politics.
Historically, although neither can agree on where Kashmir should accede,
both can agree that Kashmir should not have independence." Thus, a bilateral
132 See generally St. John, supra note 5.
'3 See Khan, supra note 2, at 525.
134 See id. at 524-25.
,'s See id. at 527.
36 See SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 289.
'37 See St. John, supra note 5, at 178-79.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 179.
140 See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 143 (referring to Kashmiris demanding independence
through the JKLF).
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approach would, at best, end with an accession solution. It confines the debate
between India and Pakistan as representatives of what the Kashmiris will want
to do. Sadly, though, even Kashmiris are not positive on the best future plans
because of serious internal division on the accession-independence issue."
Nonetheless, India does have a strong case for demanding a bilateral
approach because the rest of the Agreement refers only to consensual methods
of dispute resolution." In other words, the resolution of the Kashmir issue is
severely limited because the only way to solve it under the Simla Agreement
is through a settlement that is acceptable to both. " Neither country can force
the other to adhere to a settlement. That means that if India refuses third party
intervention, Pakistan cannot legally force the issue upon India.'" Ironically,
the two cannot find much common ground, especially regarding Kashmir.
Thus, the bilateral approach to a solution is highly unlikely to be effective."5
D. Plebiscite
The first legal question is regarding the plebiscite for the Kashmiri people.
While it is not mentioned in the Simla Agreement, it seems the best starting
point because there are specific United Nations declarations on the topic. In
fact, both Pakistan and Kashmiris point to these declarations'" in their
argument against Indian occupation.
According to the rules of international law, United Nations declarations are
all part of the corpus of international law, but only the Security Council
decisions are binding on member states." 7 According to the UN Charter,
141 See St. John, supra note 5, at 178.
142 See Khan, supra note 2, at 528.
14 See id.
144 See id.
'4 See id. at 529.
146 See STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKIsTAN TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ON 23 DECEMBER 1998, U.N. SCOR, 3954th mitg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3954
(Resumption) (1998) [hereinafter 'Pakistan's Statement, December 23'] and Memorandum
Presented by True Representatives of the Kashminr People to the 0IC, September 29, 1997,
(visited Dec. 28,1999) <http://www.U.N..int/pakistan/1597929a.htm> (on file with author); See
also, SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 286.
"4' See Christopher C. Joyner, Conclusion: The United Nations as International Law-Giver,
in THE UNITED NATIONs AND INTENATIONAL LAW 439 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
General Assembly resolutions, although, declaratory of international law are recommendations
rather than binding rules. See id. at 441. Except for administrative and budgetary issues, the
General Assembly does not have authority to make binding legal norms without the consent of
the states involved. See Id. at 440. Hence, any General Assembly resolutions on point will be
left out in the legal analysis.
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member states have an obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. '" At the same time, the Security Council also makes recommenda-
tions in the settlement of disputes,"4 9 but such recommendations cannot bind
the state. Thus, it is vital to look at the language of the UN resolutions to see
if they have legal effect.
The first of the pertinent instruments is Resolution 38 from January 1948.
This deals with the 1948 hostilities and focuses mainly on procuring a cease-
fire. 50 There is no mention of a plebiscite or of self-determination for the
Kashmiri people."' Similarly, Resolution 39 does not mention self-determina-
tion because it focuses on setting up a commission in the area." ' Resolution
47 of April 1948 is, on the other hand, more helpful. It instructs India and
Pakistan not only to demilitarize, but also to conduct a plebiscite." 3 In fact,
it is the government of India that is given the responsibility for ensuring self-
determination for the Kashmiri people.'
The language employed in this resolution does not sound obligatory. In
fact, as a preamble to the instructions, the Security Council states that it
"[rJecommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following
measures... "55 The employment of the term "recommends," is critical
because it puts Resolution 47 into the category of recommendations rather than
binding resolutions. Obligatory terms such as "instructs" refer only to the two
states' cooperation with the Commission."6
Similarly, subsequent resolutions such as 80 and 91 do not create any more
obligations.' S" Instead, they remind the parties of Resolution 47 and obligate
them to all duties under prior resolutions."8  Resolution 91 does state,
however, "[o]bserving that the question is to be decided" through a
plebiscite." 9 Once again, the terms do not sound as if they obligate the parties.
Instead, they seem like recommendations. Hence, it would be difficult to
argue that there is a legal breach of obligations by India in not committing to
a plebiscite in Kashmir pursuant to the resolutions.
1'4 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
'49 See U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para 1.
IS0 See S.C. Res. 38, U.N. SCOR, 229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/651 (1948).
15 See id.
152 See S.C. Res. 39, U.N. SCOR, 230th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/654 (1948).
113 See S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 286th mtg., U.N. Doc. Sf726 (1948).
154 See id. at § B(8).
155 Id.
156 See id.
's See Res. 91, supra note 41 and Res. 80, supra note 41.
5 See, e.g., Res. 91, supra note 41.
159 Id.
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As for the Simla Agreement, there is no mention of a plebiscite. If the
analysis focuses on the four corners of that Agreement, there is really no legal
basis for Kashmiri self-determination. There is historical evidence to the
contary, however. In fact, the original accession by the Maharaja of Jammu
and Kashmir to India was conditioned on an election for the Kashmiri people
when conditions allowed it."60 The UN resolutions further supported the idea
of Kashmiri self-determination. However, the idea did not make it into the
Simla Agreement or the Tashkent Declaration. As such, there is only a weak
legal argument that India is in breach for not giving self-determination to the
people of Kashmir. Neither the Security Council resolutions nor the Simla
Agreement and Tashkent Declaration put into writing that there is a legal
obligation to hold elections.
E. Territorial Integrity
The Simla Agreement provisions dealing with territorial integrity and
positive obligations of both countries in the maintenance of peace are also
notable. The Line of Control, which serves as a de facto border between the
countries, partitions Jammu and Kashmir between the parties; the Agreement
mandates that neither party can alter the line unilaterally through threat or use
of force. 6' Along with this mandate, the treaty also references the UN
Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against another state. " The
references to the Charter imply that the Simla Agreement and the parties to it
are to be governed by the "full force of contemporary international law."" 3 In
addition, the importance of the Line of Control as a border is that any invasion
of the line or any threat thereof will be considered a threat against the
territorial integrity of the other state.'6
This also means that the bulk of Kashmir is technically within Indian
borders. So, the LOC is not simply a cease-fire line or a demilitarized zone,
but, for all intents and purposes, it is the border."5 This distinction will
become important in the analysis of recent actions by both countries.
Along with the definition of the de facto border, the Simla Agreement has
e broad definition of territorial integrity. Not only can neither country use
force or threat of force, but neither is allowed to be involved in, aid, or
'6 See SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 148.
16 See Khan, supra note 2, at 526.
"2 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
'e Khan, supra note 2, at 526.
" See id. at 523.
6sv See id.
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encourage any action by a third party that may threaten peace in the area.'"
Moreover, the treaty mandates against any interference by one in the internal
affairs of the other country."' Finally, the treaty also requires that "[b]oth
governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propa-
ganda against each other."'"
With this in mind, many events of the recent past may be considered
contrary to the treaty obligations of both countries. For example, both
countries claim that the other is helping separatist groups," 9 which could be
considered not only interference with internal affairs of the other country, but
also contrary to the provision against encouraging activities that threaten peace
in the area. India claims that Pakistan is involved in assisting Sikh nationalists
of the Indian Punjab, while Pakistan claims that India is funding the Sindhi" °
separatists in Pakistan. 17' These allegations, if true, would be contrary to the
provisions of the 1972 Agreement, and India recognizes them as such. 72
Further, since the 1970's, Pakistan has been involved in various forms of
aid to Kashmiri insurgents. 3 Pakistan has funded various madrassas (Islamic
schools) in the area, which apparently teach anti-Indian propaganda to
Kashmiri children as well as encouraging pro-Palistani sentiment by
emphasizing their religious bond to the latter.' Once again, this type of
propaganda is forbidden by the Simla Agreement.
Most importantly, though, Pakistani support for insurgent groups has been
very prominent in the areas of arms supply and training within Pakistani
borders. s" In fact, these training camps may have been the reason for the last
serious threat of confrontation.' In May of 1990, India, in an attempt to
restore peace within Kashmir, decided to do away with the insurgent
' See Simla Agreement, supra note 39, at I ii.
167 See id. at I iii.
168 Id. at iv.
'9 See The PRS Group / Political Risk Service, N ATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, March 1,
1989, available in Lexis, Int'l Bus. Communications, Country Report.
'70 Sikhs are a minority religious group in India and are centered in the Indian province of
Punjab. On the other hand, the Sindhis are a tribal group indigenous to the Sindh province of
Pakistan.
"7 See The PRS Group, supra note 169, at 1.
'72 See CTBT India, supra note 66, at 6. In fact, the Indian government refers to the
Kashmir situation as a consequence of Pakistan's "territorial ambitions" because Pakistan "has
deliberately sought to project a distorted version of developments in the State [Kashmir] since
1947 when the State joined the union of India...." See id.
17 See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 15.
174 See id. at 15.
175 See id.
176 See id. at l10.
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sanctuaries and training camps located in Pakistani Kashmir.'" In response,
Pakistan put its air force on nuclear alert.'TI The impending confrontation was
cooled due to diplomatic intervention by U.S. officials."v
Even though that particular situation was resolved, India continues to blame
Pakistan for encouraging Kashmiri guerrilla groups.8'8 In turn, Pakistan
blames India for human rights abuses and terrorism.'' Because the area is
administered by Indian troops, the official reports rarely say that the Indian
forces are abusing human rights. However, even domestic Indian agencies and
several international agencies have noted that there are grave human rights
abuses that occur in Kashmir.' There are also similar allegations against
Pakistan.
8 3
Focusing the attention solely on the territorial integrity issue, it is evident
that both India and Pakistan are responsible for violation of the Simla
Agreement. The ongoing border clashes and negative propaganda by both
parties are in direct conflict with the Agreement. However, neither country
has taken the initiative to institute any proceedings with the International Court
of Justice, probably because of the emphasis on bilateralism in the treaty and
in Indian foreign policy.
This too changed on September 22, 1999, when Pakistan instituted
proceedings against India for shooting down a Pakistani aircraft on August 10,
1999.1" Rather than the Simla Agreement, Pakistan focused on India's
obligations under the UN Charter, the Agreement of Prevention of Air Space
Violations and customary international law. 5 In this situation, as with many
other border clashes, the dispute crossed the Line of Control. Since the LOC
is the de facto border, the clashes could very well be considered illegal and
'" See id. at 110-11.
178 See id.
179 See id.
1o Cf CTBT India, supra note 66.
'a' See LETTER DATED 4 MAY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. A/53/117, S/I 998/371 (1998) (stating that "I have been
instructed to request you to bring the aforementioned serious violation of the line of control and
heinous act of Indian terrorism to the immediate attention of the Security Council.")
1' See SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 263.
183 See A Comprehensive Note on Jammu & Kashmir at 12 (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http:l/
www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/Kashmir-MEA/introduction.html> (referring to terror-
ism sponsored by Pakistan) (on file with author).
'" See, International Court of Justice, Press Communiqu6 99/43,22 September1999 (visited
Dec. 23, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipressl999/ipresscom9943-19990
921.htm> (on file with author).
5 See id.
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against the UN Charter prohibitions against violation of territorial integrity of
another state.
Another obligation under the Simla Agreement is that neither party will
change the status quo of the area. There is, however, no definition for the
"status quo." Does the term refer to crossing the border to change the status
quo physically, or does it prohibit changing the political situation in the other
through philosophical and financial support of internal separatists? Because
the agreement mentions propaganda specifically, logic would say that change
of the status quo by propaganda is prohibited. Perhaps, the writers of the
treaty realized what an amazing weapon politics can be. From that point of
view, the propaganda that India alleges by the Pakistanis could certainly be
considered as having changed the political status quo. After all, where did
internal militants come from? They are major players, and according to
Ganguly, they only came around during the 1990's. " So, their joining the
fight is by all means a change in the status quo. Is Pakistan responsible for
that change?
Also, India has recently heightened its nationalist agenda and its propa-
ganda machine has been reminding the Kashmiris of their Indian-ness. 87
Since there are Kashmiri militants fighting on India's side, maybe India has
had a hand in the changing of the status quo as well.
'"See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 1-2. For example, General Pervaiz Musharraf said,
"Pakistan is a victim of media-coloured perceptions," and asked for the Indian media to relate
that "Pakistan wants peace." Indian Media Must Defuse Hysteria: CE, THE NEWS INTERNA-
TIONAL, July 3, 2000 (visited July 5, 2000) <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenewsjuly20O0-
daily/03-07-2000/main/main9.htm> (on file with author). The General urged Indian media to
"not give perspectives that are divorced from the truth" because "[w]hen media gives coloured
pictures of reality, it creates complications in the inter-state relations." Id.
1" A subtle example of such nationalism is evident in statements by Indian officials. Prime
Minister Vajpayee, for instance, blames Pakistan for "[t]errorist attaches on our security forces
and civilians." Prime Minister Vajpayee 's Statement on the Situation in Jammu & Kashmir,
January 18, 2001 (visited March 26, 2001) <http:/Iwww.indianembassy.org/special/cabinet
primeminister/pm_,ianuary-j8...200l.htm> (emphasis added) (on file with author). In another
statement, Vajpayee says, "[o]ur sisters and brothers in the State [Jammu and Kashmir] have
always longed for the return of peace and normalcy...." Statement by the Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee on the Situation in Jammu & Kashmir, November 19,2000 (visited March 26,
2001) <http://www.indianembassy.org/specia.. .rimneminister/pnid&.nov_ 9...2000.htm> (on
file with author). Perhaps, the terms of inclusion by the Prime Minister are in response to
feelings of resentment by Kashmiris who feel that "journalists have little time and no courage
to write truthfully about what is really happening in the Valley." 'Your Country and Mine,'
BUSINESS LINE, July 12, 2000 (visited March 24, 2001) <www.indiaserver.com/businessline
2000/07/12/stories/041255ma.htm> (on file with author). According to one author, the Indian
people's views on Kashmir can be summed up as: "Kashmir is ours and will always remain with
us. After all, it is like a moustache on a man's face." Id.
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F Nuclear Proliferation
The biggest change in the area has been nuclear proliferation by the
countries. Now, the question is whether such proliferation was contemplated
by the Simla Agreement. Whenever one discusses the legality of nuclear
weapons, the first thought goes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
however, both Pakistan and India have steadfastly refused to sign the treaty for
various reasons."' Thus, it cannot be the basis for judging the legality of their
nuclear actions. On the other hand, there is the possibility of analyzing nuclear
proliferation under not only the Simla Agreement, but also under customary
international law and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).
1. Customary International Law
There is no treaty specifically prohibiting possession or development of
nuclear weapons, and thus, the weapons are not per se illegal."" Customary
international law may, then, be the best source for discovering the legal
implication of nuclear weapons possession."° In this context, law will appear
in the form ofjus cogens (norms binding on all international actors) and opinio
juris (norms that have developed with the consent and practice of states).
The jus cogens rules tend to be very general because they bind all
international actors without a treaty, without ratification.'91 Because of this,
jus cogens rules are few and not extended very often. Among jus cogens
norms is that of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other
international actors. The UN Charter declares this norm in Article 2.192 While
the ongoing clashes over Kashmir (in so much as they violate territorial
integrity) do qualify as violations of the Charter, is the same true for the
1n See generally, William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 735 (1993)
(noting the Indian and Pakistani objections to the NPT).
"9 See Burns Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, 13
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1983) (using the law of conventional war to draw out
international law regarding nuclear weapons).
190 See id.
'9' See LouIs HENmKN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 91-92 (3d ed.
1993) (Jus Cogens (Preemptory Norms)).
'92 U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (stating that "The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.").
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nuclear testing? In other words, could the armament by India and Pakistan be
considered a threat of force against the political independence of another state?
a. Deterrence
Nuclear weapons theory is based on the idea of deterrence.'93 In fact, India
specifically refers to this theory in its nuclear program"9 and even the ICJ
discusses it in its advisory opinion.'95 According to the theory, nuclear
weapons provide security to a state because a potential aggressor will not risk
nuclear war by violating the territorial integrity of the nuclear state. The case
in point would be the Cold War where both the United States and the Soviet
Union remained rivals but did not go to war because of the fear of the use of
nuclear weapons.'" The flaw of the theory according to some is that
"[p]ossession of nuclear weapons may indeed justify an inference of
preparedness to use them."'" In other words, weaponization with deterrence
in mind means that the state is willing to use the weapons at some point, and
this future willingness to use the weapons could constitute a threat. According
to the ICJ, this argument could be valid, but it hinges on the intent of the
parties.'" So, it is vital to look at the type of use and whether it is directed at
the territorial integrity of a state or against the objectives of the UN Charter.'"
Pakistan considers the Indian tests to be exactly that-a threat. In a
statement to the United Nations, the Pakistani representative said that the tests
by India "affirmed that it had the "big bomb" and [that India] threatened
Pakistan with use of nuclear weapons and held out a threat of nuclear
blackmail to impose a military solution in Kashmir."20 ° This was the rationale
'"See Weston, supra note 189, at 13.
'"See Paper Laid on the Table, supra note 49, at 20 (referring to its nuclear capabilities
as a nuclear deterrent).
'" See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. (I) 226 (July 8), 254,
para 66.
'9 See Weston, supra note 189, at 13.
'97 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 195, at 246, para 48. In
a NovembTr 1998 resolution, the General Assembly also noted that "the proposition that nuclear
weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used accidentally or by decision denies
credibility, and that the only complete defence (sic) is the elimination of nuclear weapons. .
See U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/53/L.48/REV.I (1998).
19 See id.
'9 See id.
= LETTER DATED 2 JuLY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPREsENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/1998/605*
(1998).
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for their own tests. Even though Pakistan felt the tests to be a threat, an
analysis under the ICJ standard reveals that they probably were not. After all,
India repeatedly stated that the tests were not directed towards any particular
nation, but were "peaceful.""' Its official reasons are national security and
defense.'2 Despite the logic of the inference of a threat, there has been no
official nuclear aggression or threat. In fact, India reiterates a no-first-use
policy.' 3 Looking at the ICJ language focused on the intent and credibility of
any intent for future use, India's testing is probably not illegal. On the other
hand, some scholars urge that even technically legal possession should be
illegal because of the flaws in the deterrent theory.2" Despite the appeal of the
idea, under current law as interpreted by the ICJ, India's nuclear testing was
not illegal. By extension, because Pakistan tested its weapons in response to
what it considered a real threat to its national security,2 the Pakistani tests
were legal as well.
On a related note, India considers its nuclear option an exercise of its
sovereignty.' According to the Indian National Security Advisory Board,
"[a]utonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic
matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people."20 7 In an
address to the Parliament, the Indian executive said that "India believes it is
the sovereign right of every nation to make a judgment regarding its supreme
national interests and exercise its sovereign choice." This basis for the
nuclear option, i.e., sovereignty, also poses a serious challenge to a general
international law argument against Indian testing. After all, probably the most
fundamentaljus cogens principle is that of sovereign equality of a state.2' In
fact, international law is a positivist institution based on sovereign equality, so
that each nation chooses to be bound by international law because it has the
sovereign power to do so.' 0 This underlying principle of India's nuclear
20 Interview with Vajpayee, supra note 59, at 9.
2See id. See also India Hits out at Critics of its Nuclear Tests, supra note 69; Paper Laid
on the Table, supra note 49.See NSAB, supra note 63.
See, e.g., David Krieger, The Challenge Posed by India and Pakistan, The Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation (last modified July 1998)<http://www.napf.orglasia/challenge.htn1> (on file
with author).
205 See Sharifs remarks, supra note 85.
See, NSAB, supra note 63, at § 1.3.
W7 id.
2 Paper Laid on the Table, supra note 49, at 2.
209 See HENKIN, supra note 191, at 92 (stating that "the equality of states" is a recognized
principle ofjus cogens).
230 See id. at 10 (noting that "International law has been said not to be "real law" since it is
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policy is nearly impossible to argue because even if testing nuclear weapons
could be considered a threat under the ICJ definition, it would be overridden
by the venerable argument of sovereign equality. As for Pakistan, its tests
having been in direct response to India could not even qualify as a threat
because the requisite hostile intention would be missing from the defensive
posture Pakistan has already taken towards its nuclear program. Therefore, the
tests by India and Pakistan are not illegal under the general principles of
international law.
2. The Simla Agreement
However, moving to the more specific source of the Simla Agreement, the
original tests by India could be considered illegal because they have changed
the status quo of the area. One of the major parts of the Simla Agreement was
the prohibition against any unilateral action to change the status quo.211 In this
context, the nuclear tests do significantly change the face of the Kashmir
conflict. Pakistan considers the nuclear tests to be inextricably linked to
Kashmir. On the Indian side, even though neither Pakistan nor Kashmir are
specifically mentioned in connection with the nuclear tests, issues surrounding
both are subtly present. After all, there are references to "clandestine
acquisition of nuclear materials," and to "externally aided and abetted
terrorism, militancy and clandestine war through hired mercenaries." 3 China,
a known nuclear power, is obviously not the security threat to which these
phrases refer. The only other option is that they refer to India's other
threat-Pakistan. Further, references to externally aided terrorism are also
aimed at Pakistan and specifically Pakistan's actions in Kashmir. Similar
sentiments were reiterated in another statement in Parliament by Prime
Minister Vajpayee.2 14 With the history of India and Pakistani rivalries in mind,
the inference that nuclear weapons do have an affect on the Kashmir issue is
not far fetched. In fact, nuclear tests have a major impact on the Kashmir issue
because now a conflict over Kashmir could turn into a nuclear war. In this
context, Indian tests (having been first) would be illegal because they were a
unilateral change in the status quo.
commonly disregarded, states obeying it only when they wish to, when it is in their interest to
do so.").
21 See Simla Agreement, supra note 39.
12 See LETTERDATED2 JULY 1 998, supra note 200, at 3 (declaring that"Jammu and Kashmir
lies at the heart of the problems between India and Pakistan.").
233 Paper Laid on the Table, supra note 49, at 8.
234 See Suo Moto Statement, supra note 2, at para 7.
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Under the Simla Agreement, therefore, there have been a score of
violations. Both India and Pakistan have been guilty of these transgressions
whether they were in the form of propaganda, military exchange at the Line of
Control, or aid to terrorists and insurgents. Nuclear armament is simply the
next violation.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The question now is what can be done with the many violations by both
countries? Is there a solution that will actively deal with not only settling the
Kashmir dispute, but also stabilizing the nuclear balance of the area? In fact,
the international community does have a score of solutions, some even
suggested by India and Pakistan. The only requirement is that there has to be
compromise by India and Pakistan and action by the world at large. The
nuclear dimension added to the Kashmir dispute has raised the issue to a
critical stage and it is now time for the international community to revisit
Kashmir and try to find a solution for it. What that means for India and
Pakistan is that they must recognize the miserable failure of a bilateral
approach to the conflict.
In the process of finding a workable solution to Kashmir, one has to look
at all of the parties involved and consider an approach that will appease each.
That may be the most difficult aspect of the Kashmir debate. India is resolute
that Kashmir is an Indian state and that the accession by the Maharaja was
legal and final."IS On the other hand, Pakistan's problem with Kashmir is
specifically that the accession was not legal.2'6 At the same time, India refuses
to resolve the Kashmir issue in a multilateral forun and continues to press for
bilateral negotiations for both the nuclear problem and the Kashmir
situation.2 7 On the other hand, Pakistan continues to press for international
involvement. 2 s
As discussed earlier, a bilateral approach has proven to be very problem-
atic; however, the framework of the Simla Agreement does depend on it.
215 See A Comprehensive Note on Jammu & Kashmir, supra note 179; see also, STATEMENT
BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIAAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., 9th mtg., at 42, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.9 (1999).
"6 See SCHOFILD, supra note 92, at 163.
217 See, e.g., A Comprehensive Note Jammu & Kashmir, supra note 183 and NSAB, supra
note 63.
218 See SCOR Debate, June 6, 1998, supra note 86, at 31 (stating that the U.N. has failed its
international duty to maintain peace by leaving India and Pakistan to settle the problems
themselves); see also, LETTER DATED 2 JULY 1998, supra note 200, at 3.
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Despite the numerous violations by both countries, there have been attempts
at a bilateral approach. The most recent result was the Lahore Declaration of
February 21, 1999. Without deciding on any specific issues, the instrument
simply states that the countries are determined to execute the "letter and spirit"
of the Simla Agreement by "intensify[ing] their composite and integrated
dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral
agenda."' 9 However, other than reaffirming the Simla Agreement, the
declaration provides no concrete mechanisms for a solution. It is, essentially,
another paper that, while affirming in theory that there will be a solution, does
not define how that solution will come about.
Looking at the last fifty-three years, it is apparent that there is a serious
problem between the countries concerning Kashmir. What is also apparent is
that the mechanisms that have been used are not working. More specifically,
it is the bilateral approach that has failed. In fact, others have also recognized
that the negotiation process has proven fruitless. ° In the same vain, it is
recognized that the use of bilateralism to cut off the Kashmir debate from the
international arena is counter-productive.221 In the words of the Pakistani
government, "[i]f Pakistan and India could have sorted out these problems by
themselves, today South Asia would not have been nuclearized. " The
sentiment is very realistic. Indeed, Pakistan and India have proven that they
cannot find a solution to their problems on their own, and any solution has to
come with the understanding that the status quo is not acceptable. For that to
happen, "both countries may have to give away the moral high ground and
admit some incontrovertible truths."m In essence, strict bilateralism has to be
abandoned for a different negotiation process whereby the United Nations and
the international community could intervene and find a diplomatic solution.
Another important thing to recognize is that aside from accession, there is
a very real, and perhaps a better solution: independence for the Kashmiri
people. In any case, the future should be decided by the Kashmiris, i.e., self-
determination.' But, the question remains as to who will be responsible for
carrying out the elections whereby the Kashmiris can decide their own future?
Although the bulk of Kashmir is within India, leaving the elections in
Indian hands may not be wise. The international community has done this
219 The Lahore Declaration, February 21, 1999, India-Pak. (visited Feb. 3, 2000) <http:fl
www.indianembassy.org/SouthLAsia/Pakistan/lahoredeclaration.html> (on file with author).
220 See Khan, supra note 2, at 529.
' See i. at 530.
2n SCOR Debate, June 6, 1998, supra note 86, at 31.
223 SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 292.
224 See Khan, supra note 2, at 531.
2001] 389
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
before, and it proved unsuccessful. So, perhaps, it is time for a more active
role from the international community, much as Pakistan has been demanding.
There are those who feel that a plebiscite is neither workable nor
desirable. 22 After all, the problems range from who would be considered
'Kashmiri' and be eligible to vote and who would make sure there would be
an impartial election to what would happen to the minority Hindu and
Buddhist populations.' However, rather than denying the right of self-
determination to the whole group and leaving the situation as is, it is more
desirable to allow them the opportunity to at least try and choose their own
future. Aside from this, a further difficulty is that India probably would not
agree to a plebiscite.227 In fact, there is doubt if even Pakistan would really
care for a true vote because neither country wants to give up any control over
Kashmir whether it is the Indian occupied valley or the Pakistani occupied
Azad Kashmir.m
As much as India and Pakistan desire, however, there is no clear cut answer
to the situation. After all, they are not the only players. And, since it is the
Kashmiris who are in the thick of the disaster, they should have a hand in
deciding what happens to them. As one scholar notes, "[u]nless the Kashmiris
themselves can be made to feel that they have been given the freedom to
choose their destiny, the issue may never be laid to rest." 22
To counteract the problems of a plebiscite controlled by India, the United
Nations should step in as the unbiased mediator. After all, in this era of
burgeoning humanitarian rights, it seems only logical for the international
community to enter and protect the rights of the Kashmiri people as it had
affirmed in the UN declarations.
Another possible solution is some sort of an Indian protectorate.' Under
the traditional protectorate model, the Kashmiri insurgency would make a
treaty with the Indian government so that except for defense, the Kashmiris
could control their own internal and external policies." ' The option may be
viable, but it may not be attractive for India, which claims Kashmir as its own
' See, e.g., GANGULY, supra note 8, at 142-43.
U See id.
22 See ScHOFIO, supra note 92, at 286. One of the serious Indian concerns is that if
Kashmir is given the choice and does decide on independence, then other states will also try to
secede from the Indian Union. See id.
22s See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 145.
2" SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 291.
1" See GANGULY, supra note 8, at 144.
23 See Id.
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state; 2 however, India will have to choose an unattractive option in any case
to try and put the issue to rest. Perhaps one in which India retains some
control may be more desirable for India and considerably less desirable for
Pakistan. Another option is that the United Nations could create a trusteeship
in Kashmir as was done with many former colonies after World War I.23 All
of the former trusteeships have now achieved self-government, ' and if the
international community was successful with those areas, perhaps, that is an
option for Kashmir. With a UN trusteeship in Kashmir, Pakistan could not
complain that there is no self-determination or that India is suppressing the
Kashmiri people. On the other hand, India could finally solve the Kashmiri
problem by handing it over to the trusteeship.
There has been concern that the UN peacekeeping operations may not be
productive in solving long-term conflicts; 5 however, these concerns regard
traditional peacekeeping, which has focused on maintaining the status quo by
halting hostilities rather than by attempting to solve the underlying problem." 6
Instead, the United Nations should take an active part by providing peacekeep-
ing while also pushing for a diplomatic solution for Kashmir that will appease
all who are involved." 7 However, for this to be successful, both Pakistan and
India must cooperate and compromise, something that they have been
unwilling to do historically. m
Another important part of finding a peacefid solution to the Kashmir issue
is to forge some understanding that military force will not be used on or across
the border by either party. Rather than reiterating theoretical commitments to
peace, it is time for India and Pakistan to come to a cease-fire agreement that
they will both honor. This will also be an essential in alleviating the dangers
of a nuclear war between the rivals.' 9 Perhaps, the United States, with its
historical ties to both countries and Russia and China could also get involved
in diplomatically finding a solution to demilitarize Kashmir and push for
Kashmiri self-determination.' The United States "could be instrumental in
232 See SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 289.
'" See HENKIN, supra note 191, at 296.
214 See id.
'3' See generally, Paul F. Diehl et al., United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,
50 INT'L ORG. 683 (Sept. 1, 1996), available In 1996 WL 13353025.
2'6 See id. at 4.
237 See id. at5.
238 See SCHOFIELD, supra note 92, at 289.
," See "The Kashmir Tinderbox," The New York Times on the Web, June 28, 1998 (visited
Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.nancho.net/follap/kashmir/jknytl.htmil> (on file with author).
240 See id.
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helping to reduce tensions between the countries over ... Kashmir and in
applying pressure to get them both to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty .... 9,241
At the same time, it is vital that there be some resolution to halting a
prospective nuclear arms race in the region. As noted earlier, both countries
have refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They also refuse to
sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although both countries
have declared moratoriums on further testing; however, the unilateral
declarations to discontinue testing are far from a permanent solution.
In order to forge a permanent solution to the nuclear problem there has to
be a universal solution to nuclear weapons. After all, one of India's main
objections to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is that it is not
comprehensive enough. 2' The CTBT, for example, forbids all explosive tests,
which may be the crux of Asian nuclear capabilities, but it leaves room for the
United States to test its weapons through computer simulation.24'3 The problem
is similar to the problems with the NPT-while the treaty might disable Asian
nuclear capabilities, it leaves the West free to develop its own weapons with
its superior technology.2" Pakistan, on the other hand, refuses to sign the
CTBT until India does so as well.
245
The problem is that the world has been unable to find a universal approach
to nuclear disarmament. But, it seems unwise to leave South Asia on its own
while the international community decides on a global solution. Perhaps
starting a regional approach to the nuclear issue may be the best solution for
South Asia. Currently, Pakistan is pushing for India to enter negotiation for
a fissile material control treaty.2' Unfortunately, India is not entertaining the
idea.247 In fact, India has said that "regionalization of the concept of a world
24' Barr Seitz, US. Has Small Role in S. Asia, ABC NEwS.cOM, May 29, 1998 (visited Jan.
27,2000) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/india-pakistan990529.htnl>
(on file with author).
242 See CTBT India, supra note 66.
24 See Vikas Kapur, Nuclear Empowerment: Understanding India's Refusal to Sign the Test
Ban (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <www.digitas.harvard.edu/-perspy/issues/ I996/octlindia.html> (on
file with author).
244 See Press Release of the UN. Permanent Mission of India (visited Dec. 27, 1999)
<www.clw.org/coalition/inU.N.0515.htm> (on file with author) (referring to the Nuclear States'
refusal to alter their nuclear programs while attempting to limit Indian nuclear capabilities).
24s See Pakistan to Retain Right to Conduct Nuclear Tests, supra note 9 1.
246 See STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 9th mtg., at 31, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.9 (1999).
247 See STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 9th mtg., at 43, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.9 (1999).
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free of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with our global approach to this
question. ' '248 Rather, India prefers the more comprehensive approach of a
complete and universal disarmament.249
Although the Indian position on test ban does carry some weight, it is too
stringent an approach. It is counter-productive because it leaves the status quo
unchanged while waiting out the possibility of a totally comprehensive test
ban. Instead, India and Pakistan should both accept the CTBT with all of its
weaknesses if they truly are committed to nuclear disarmament. The 'all or
nothing' approach to nuclear testing takes the positivist approach to the
international issue too far. Self-defense and deterrence aside, nuclear weapons
are a dangerous future for the world, and for there to be a successful end to the
nuclear threat, there has to be some compromise between the state's perception
of its own security and the reality of nuclear weapons for the rest of the world.
As with the Kashmir issue, there is a need for international involvement in
order for, so that both Pakistan and India to come to some solution to stabilize
the area once and for all. Initiatives by the other nuclear powers to actively
move towards disarmament and to give confidence building measures to the
non-nuclear states are all a part of creating a world community that is working
cohesively to minimize the nuclear threat.
V. CONCLUSION
The Twentieth Century proved to be one filled with war and terrorism, one
bombarded with regional conflicts. It was also the century that saw the
independence of a myriad nations and peoples. Now, that the Twenty-First
Century is beginning, perhaps the world should welcome it as the century of
peace. But, peace must begin somewhere, and one of the best places for. it to
begin is in South Asia. The debate over Kashmir is now 53 years old and it
has brought along its dangerous new companion-nuclear weapons.
In order to conciliate the fire that remains buried deep in Pakistani and
Indian politics, it is time for the international community to enter and take its
new responsibilities. It is time for the world to solve the Kashmiri problem
and help bring peace to a war torn nation of people. In the democratic vain of
anti-colonialism, it is time to give true self-determination to the Kashmiris,
and it is finally time for India and Pakistan to let go of the historic conflict and
248 STATEMENT BY THE INDIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.N. GAOR,
32nd Sess., 100th mtg., at 26, U.N. Doc. A/32/PV.100 (1977).
249 See id. at 43.
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find a real, workable solution by cooperating with the international commu-
nity.
